What happened
Cyrus SASL is a library that many Linux and Unix servers use to authenticate users, most often mail servers and directory services. A flaw in its SRP mechanism lets an attacker who can reach the service over the network log in as any existing user without knowing the password. On November 15, 2026, VulnCheck issued CVE-2026-129483 for it and credits the discovery to a researcher known as afldl.
The state of the project makes things worse. On October 9, 2026, Alan Coopersmith of Oracle Solaris Engineering, citing an issue in the project repository, pointed out on the oss-sec mailing list that Cyrus SASL has not shipped a new version since 2022 and that the maintainers are not responding to reported security issues. According to him, former maintainers say they are no longer involved.
Besides the SRP flaw, Coopersmith listed other open issues, such as a heap buffer overflow in the DIGEST-MD5 mechanism, an out-of-bounds read in SCRAM handling and memory leaks. Red Hat assigned CVE-2026-107161 to a bug that appears to match the DIGEST-MD5 issue.
It is not known whether attackers are already exploiting the SRP flaw. The US agency CISA has not added it to its catalog of exploited vulnerabilities, and the European EUVD database (entry EUVD-2026-126032) does not report exploitation.
Why it is dangerous
This is an authentication bypass (CWE-287, Improper Authentication). SRP is a protocol in which the server and client verify a password without sending it over the network: both sides derive a shared secret from it and check that the results match. Cyrus SASL, however, fails to validate one of the values the client sends. An attacker can send a specially chosen value that always produces the same shared secret, and the server accepts it regardless of the password.
Think of a lock that is supposed to reject every wrong key, yet opens for a completely blank key because nobody taught it to recognize one. The attacker needs no login and no help from a user. Network access to the service and the name of an existing account are enough. According to VulnCheck, the attacker is then logged in as that user and also learns the session keys.
What the attacker gains depends on the service. On a mail server it could mean access to a mailbox or the ability to send mail as the victim. In a directory service it means access to data with that account’s permissions. Picking an administrator account widens the impact. Neither VulnCheck nor the oss-sec report mentions code execution or direct server takeover.
The CVSS score rates severity on a scale from 0 to 10. VulnCheck scored this flaw 9.1 under CVSS 3.1, which is critical, and rates it 9.3 under the newer CVSS 4.0.
The CISA KEV catalog lists vulnerabilities with confirmed exploitation. This one is not in it yet. EPSS estimates the probability of exploitation within the next 30 days: as of November 16, 2026 it was 0.38%, higher than roughly 32% of other vulnerabilities. A low number does not mean you are safe, because no fixed version exists.
Who is affected
All Cyrus SASL versions up to and including 2.1.28 are affected, which includes the latest release. The library ships with most Linux distributions. It is used, for example, by the Postfix, Sendmail and Cyrus IMAP mail servers, the OpenLDAP directory server and other services that offer SASL login. Typical environments are company mail servers, web hosting with email and internal directory services.
The flaw only concerns the server-side SRP mechanism, though. A server is at risk if it has the SRP plugin installed and offers it to clients. So start by finding out whether that applies to your server. If your server does not offer SRP, this particular flaw does not affect you, but the other unfixed bugs in the library remain.
How to check if you are affected
First, find out which version is installed. All commands below only read data and change nothing.
# Debian, Ubuntu
dpkg -l | grep -i sasl
# RHEL, AlmaLinux, Rocky Linux, Fedora
rpm -qa | grep -i sasl
More importantly, check whether the SRP mechanism is available on the server. List the server mechanisms and look for SRP, or look for a libsrp file in the plugin directory.
pluginviewer -s 2>/dev/null || saslpluginviewer -s
ls /usr/lib*/sasl2/ /usr/lib/*/sasl2/ 2>/dev/null | grep -i srp
Also check the mech_list setting in your SASL configuration (for Cyrus IMAP, sasl_mech_list in /etc/imapd.conf). If it is set and does not include SRP, the service does not offer it. If it is missing, the service may offer every installed mechanism.
grep -rIi mech_list /etc/sasl2/ /etc/postfix/sasl/ /etc/ldap/sasl2/ /etc/imapd.conf /usr/lib*/sasl2/ /usr/lib/*/sasl2/ 2>/dev/null
For OpenLDAP, you can see the offered mechanisms with an ldapsearch query. A mail server lists them on the AUTH line after the EHLO command.
ldapsearch -x -H ldap://localhost -b "" -s base supportedSASLMechanisms
How to fix it
There is no fixed version yet. The latest Cyrus SASL release is 2.1.28, and according to the oss-sec report the maintainers are not responding. VulnCheck’s advisory references a commit in the project repository, but no official release containing a fix has been published. The project has not provided a workaround, so we recommend these general steps in this order:
- Find out whether any service offers SRP (see the previous section). If none does, this flaw does not directly threaten you, but keep watching for updates.
- If you do not need SRP, turn it off. Set
mech_listin the service configuration to only the mechanisms you actually use, or uninstall the SRP plugin. Back up the configuration first, restart the service during a maintenance window and confirm that users can still log in. - Use a firewall to restrict services with SASL login (SMTP submission, IMAP, LDAP) to trusted networks or VPN, where your operations allow it.
- Follow your Linux distribution’s security announcements. Distributions may ship a fix in their own packages before the project releases a new version. When they do, update with your usual package manager.
- Since the project is not actively maintained and has other unfixed bugs, consider a long-term plan to reduce your reliance on Cyrus SASL.
What if you may already be compromised
Neither VulnCheck nor the original reporter has published any indicators of compromise. The attacker logs in as a real user, so in the logs it looks like an ordinary successful login. Rather than hunting for new accounts, look for unusual logins to existing ones.
- Logins using the SRP mechanism in mail, authentication and system logs (
/var/log/mail.log,/var/log/maillog,/var/log/auth.log,/var/log/syslog,/var/log/messages,journalctl). Postfix records them assasl_method=SRP, OpenLDAP asmech=SRP. They are especially suspicious if your users do not normally use SRP. - Successful logins from unknown IP addresses or at unusual times.
- An unexpected rise in outgoing mail or spam sent from company accounts.
- New forwarding rules in mailboxes and unexpected changes in the LDAP directory.
The commands below search both current and older compressed logs as well as the systemd journal. They only read data.
zgrep -Ei 'sasl_method=SRP|mech=SRP|SRP User logged in' /var/log/mail.log* /var/log/maillog* /var/log/auth.log* /var/log/syslog* /var/log/messages* 2>/dev/null
journalctl --no-pager 2>/dev/null | grep -Ei 'sasl_method=SRP|mech=SRP|SRP User logged in'
If you find SRP logins you cannot explain, or they involve an administrator account, bring in an incident response specialist. Preserve the logs before making further changes. If personal data may have leaked, consider your GDPR notification obligations.