What happened
Erlang/OTP is a programming environment and set of libraries that powers many server applications, especially ones built to stay available and handle lots of connections at once. It includes the ssl application, which handles encrypted communication over TLS. On September 22, 2026, the Erlang/OTP team published security advisory GHSA-rgxr-4g4w-j875 for CVE-2026-89422, a flaw in the TLS 1.3 client.
When an Erlang application opens an encrypted connection to another server, the flaw lets someone else entirely pose as that server. Under certain conditions the client never checks the server certificate, so it never confirms who it is really talking to. The bug was found and responsibly disclosed by Milad Nasr and Luna Tong of Anthropic, and the fix was developed by Ingela Andin of the Erlang/OTP team.
The vulnerability is not in the CISA KEV catalog, and ENISA’s European Vulnerability Database (entry EUVD-2026-84338) records no exploitation. The vendor does not mention any active attacks. Fixed versions are already available.
Why it is dangerous
This is a “key exchange without entity authentication” flaw (CWE-322). A TLS connection has two jobs: encrypt the traffic and prove that the other side really is who it claims to be. The server certificate provides that proof. With this bug the encryption still works, but the identity check is skipped.
Picture a courier who may only hand over a parcel after checking an ID card. Someone says “we know each other from last time” and the courier hands it over without checking, even though they have never met. In the same way, the Erlang/OTP client believes a reply claiming to resume an earlier session that the client never offered. It then skips checking the certificate, the server name and certificate revocation (CRL, OCSP).
The attacker needs no login and no user action, and the attack works over the network. They do have to be the one answering the client’s connection: either they run the server the client connects to, or they sit between client and server (for example a compromised router, a rogue Wi-Fi network or a spoofed DNS record). According to the vendor, the attacker then holds all session keys, can read everything the application sends (passwords, tokens, request bodies) and can forge every response. This is not a direct server takeover, but stolen credentials can open the door to other systems.
The CVSS score is 9.3 out of 10, meaning critical, under the newer CVSS 4.0. It was assigned by the Erlang Ecosystem Foundation, which manages CVE records for the Erlang ecosystem, not by NVD. EPSS, an estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, stood at about 0.46% on November 18, 2026, higher than roughly 40% of rated vulnerabilities. The CISA KEV catalog, a list of flaws with confirmed exploitation, does not include this bug.
Who is affected
Affected are Erlang/OTP versions from 22.2 onward that do not yet include the fix:
- OTP 29 before 29.1.1
- OTP 28 before 28.5.0.7
- OTP 27 before 27.3.4.18
- OTP 22.2 through OTP 26, for which the vendor lists no fixed version
- the
sslapplication from 9.5 before 11.2.12.13, 11.6.0.6 and 11.7.7
Only the client side is affected, meaning cases where your Erlang or Elixir application itself opens a TLS 1.3 connection. The vendor names HTTPS requests via httpc, database and messaging client libraries, and encrypted links between Erlang nodes (TLS distribution). The default configuration is affected. Clients restricted to TLS 1.2 are not affected, and versions before OTP 22.2 do not have this bug.
You will find Erlang/OTP in in-house Erlang or Elixir applications and in products that embed it (RabbitMQ, ejabberd and CouchDB, for example, are built on Erlang). Whether a given product is affected depends on whether it uses TLS 1.3 as a client. Those vendors have not publicly addressed the flaw yet, so watch their own advisories.
How to check if you are affected
All commands below only read information and change nothing. First, check whether Erlang is installed as a system package:
dpkg -l | grep -i erlang
rpm -qa | grep -i erlang
The exact OTP version is in the OTP_VERSION file. If the version ends with **, the system was patched with otp_patch_apply and mixes applications from different versions.
erl -noshell -eval '{ok,V}=file:read_file(filename:join([code:root_dir(),"releases",erlang:system_info(otp_release),"OTP_VERSION"])), io:format("~s",[V]), halt().'
What matters most is the ssl application version:
erl -noshell -eval 'application:load(ssl), {ok,V}=application:get_key(ssl,vsn), io:format("~s~n",[V]), halt().'
Many products ship their own embedded Erlang, which is not updated with the OS and often has no OTP_VERSION file. You can find it by its ssl-<version> directories:
find / -type d -name "ssl-[0-9]*" -path "*/lib/*" 2>/dev/null
You are fine if your version is equal to or higher than the fixed version in the same release line.
How to fix it
The vendor has released fixed Erlang/OTP versions 27.3.4.18, 28.5.0.7 and 29.1.1, which ship the ssl application as 11.2.12.13, 11.6.0.6 and 11.7.7. Upgrading is the recommended fix. The vendor lists no fixed versions for OTP 22.2 through OTP 26, so those systems need to move to a release line that has a fix.
- List every server and application that uses Erlang/OTP, including products with an embedded Erlang.
- Start with applications that connect over TLS 1.3 to internet services or across networks you do not control, and those that send passwords or API keys.
- Upgrade Erlang/OTP to the fixed version in your release line (system package, Docker image or your own build). For packaged products, wait for an update from their vendor.
- Restart the affected applications and nodes so the new code is loaded, then confirm the version with the commands from the previous section.
If you cannot upgrade right away, the vendor offers a workaround: restrict client connections to TLS 1.2 by setting {versions, ['tlsv1.2']} in the client’s ssl options. You lose TLS 1.3 in the process. According to the vendor, no configuration keeps TLS 1.3 while also fixing the issue.
The flaw is not in the CISA KEV catalog, so CISA has set no mandatory action or deadline. Still, the critical score is reason enough not to delay the upgrade.
What if you may already be compromised
This attack does not leave the usual traces such as new files or unknown accounts on the server. An attacker could have read and altered data your application sent over vulnerable TLS 1.3 connections. The vendor names two traces visible inside the application:
ssl:peercert/1returns{error, no_peercert}even though server verification (verify_peer) is enabled.ssl:connection_information/2reports{session_resumption, true}for a client that never held a session ticket.
If you see such signs, or the application talked across untrusted networks, rotate the passwords, tokens and API keys it sent over those connections. Review access logs of the services it connected to, as well as DNS and network device settings. If you suspect misuse, bring in an incident response specialist.