Security alerts · November 20, 2026

Etherpad flaw lets anyone read server files without logging in and can lead to server takeover

Etherpad versions 1.8.14 through 3.3.2 contain a critical flaw (CVSS 9.8). Anyone who can reach the server over the network can read its files without logging in, including the configuration with the admin password. With it, an attacker can then take over the server. Update to 3.3.3.

What happened

Etherpad is an open-source editor that lets several people write in the same document at once. Companies, schools and organisations often run it on their own servers as an alternative to cloud services. On October 27, 2026, the project’s developers published security advisory GHSA-mc8w-wjhw-45x5 on GitHub about a critical flaw tracked as CVE-2026-114516. It was added to the US National Vulnerability Database (NVD) on November 19, 2026.

The bug sits in the part of Etherpad that serves static files such as plugin scripts and stylesheets to the browser. Without logging in, an attacker can use it to download any file on the server that the user running Etherpad can read. According to the project’s advisory, this can expose the admin password and, from there, lead to running the attacker’s own code on the server.

No exploitation is known so far. The flaw is not in the CISA KEV catalog, and the EU vulnerability database EUVD (entry EUVD-2026-130784) does not report exploitation. However, the advisory includes a detailed technical write-up and a proof of concept, which makes an attacker’s job easier.

Why it is dangerous

This is a path traversal bug, meaning a way to escape the allowed folder (CWE-22), combined with missing authentication (CWE-306) and exposure of sensitive information (CWE-200). Picture a doorman who checks a visitor’s pass for any instruction like “go up one floor”. A clerk behind him then rewrites the pass and turns a harmless character into exactly that instruction. Nobody checks it again, and the visitor can walk into any room in the building.

According to the advisory, this code runs before the login check. The attacker needs no account and no password, only network access to Etherpad’s web port, whether from the internet or inside your network. Settings that require users to log in do not help, and the advisory says a reverse proxy does not stop the attack either.

What an attacker can obtain:

  • settings.json and credentials.json, which hold the admin password, session key, database credentials and SSO secrets
  • the process environment variables, where Docker Compose deployments often keep the admin or database password
  • the database with the content of every document, TLS private keys and system files
  • with the admin password: rewrite the configuration, extract all data and use the plugin installer to run code as the Etherpad user, i.e. take over the server

The CVSS score rates severity on a scale from 0 to 10. This flaw scores 9.8, which is “critical”. The score was assigned under CVSS 3.1 by GitHub, through which the project published the advisory, and NVD lists it in its record. The CISA KEV catalog lists flaws known to be exploited by attackers. This one is not listed yet, but that is no reason to delay the update.

Who is affected

Anyone running Etherpad (npm package etherpad-lite) version 1.8.14 through 3.3.2 is affected. According to the advisory, a normal production deployment on Linux with no special configuration is enough, for example the official Docker image or a source install running as a systemd service.

Instances exposed directly to the internet are at the highest risk. Companies, schools, non-profits and public bodies often use them to write meeting notes and drafts together. Internal servers are also at risk if someone on the internal network, or an already compromised computer, can reach them.

The advisory lists versions 1.8.14 through 3.3.2 as affected, and version 3.3.3 fixes the bug. The advisory describes the bug on Linux and similar systems and does not explicitly assess Windows deployments. If Etherpad is part of another product or a hosted service you use, ask the provider which version they run.

How to check if you are affected

All commands below only read information and change nothing. You can also find the version in the Etherpad admin interface at /admin, usually on the help page with system information.

For a source install, find where the application lives (the service name may differ) and print the version:

systemctl cat etherpad
grep '"version"' /path/to/etherpad/src/package.json

For Docker, list the running containers and the image in use. In the official image the application usually lives in /opt/etherpad-lite:

docker ps
docker exec CONTAINER_NAME grep '"version"' /opt/etherpad-lite/src/package.json

If the version is between 1.8.14 and 3.3.2, you are vulnerable. Also check which address Etherpad accepts connections on. The default port is 9001:

ss -tln | grep ':9001'

If the local address column shows an asterisk or an all-zeros address, Etherpad listens on every network interface. For Docker, the PORTS column in the docker ps output shows the same. To confirm whether the server is really reachable from the internet, test it from a computer outside your network.

How to fix it

Version 3.3.3 fixes the flaw. The NVD record also links to the related pull request #8081 in the ether/etherpad repository. The project lists no temporary workaround, and the advisory says a reverse proxy does not help. Updating is therefore the only reliable step.

  • Update internet-facing instances first, then internal ones.
  • Back up the configuration (settings.json, credentials.json) and the document database.
  • With Docker, switch the image to version 3.3.3 and recreate the container. With a source install, move to release 3.3.3 following the project’s instructions and restart the service.
  • After the restart, confirm the version using the steps in the previous section.
  • Change the admin password, database password, session key (sessionKey) and SSO secrets, because an attacker may have read them before you updated. If the TLS certificate’s private key was stored on the server, consider replacing it as well.

If you cannot update right away, temporarily restrict access to Etherpad to trusted networks only, for example with a firewall or a VPN. This is our general advice, not a measure from the project, and it does not replace the update.

What if you may already be compromised

The project has not published an official list of indicators of compromise. Based on the technical description in the advisory, these are worth checking:

  • requests to paths starting with /static/plugins/ that contain an encoded backslash %5C or %5c, in your reverse proxy or web server logs
  • admin logins (/admin-auth/) from unknown IP addresses or at unusual times
  • unknown plugins (packages starting with ep_) in the plugin list in the admin interface
  • unexpected changes to settings.json, unplanned Etherpad restarts and unknown processes running as the Etherpad user

You can search the logs like this. The zgrep command also covers older compressed logs. Adjust the path for your server, and note that without a reverse proxy in front of Etherpad you may not have such logs at all:

zgrep -i '/static/plugins/.*%5c' /var/log/nginx/access.log*
zgrep -i '/static/plugins/.*%5c' /var/log/apache2/access.log*

If you find such requests with a successful response, or an unknown plugin, treat the server as compromised. Disconnect it from the network, change every password and key that was stored on it, and bring in an incident response specialist. An attacker able to run code may have moved on to other systems the server could reach.

Sources

Articles are put together by an AI agent from public sources (vendors, CISA, ENISA, NVD, SK-CERT, NÚKIB), and version numbers and CVEs are checked against them automatically. Always confirm the steps in the vendor advisory before touching production.

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